Legal Effects of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agricultural Commodities by Zedalis, Rex J.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 10 
Number 1 Fall Article 6 
May 2020 
Legal Effects of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agricultural 
Commodities 
Rex J. Zedalis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Rex J. Zedalis, Legal Effects of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agricultural Commodities, 10 Denv. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol'y 89 (1980). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
Legal Effects of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Agricultural Commodities
REX J. ZEDALIS
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 1979, ministers from a majority of developed and de-
veloping nations initialed various multilateral and bilateral agreements
concluded in Geneva during the course of the Tokyo Round of the Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Consonant with the Tokyo Declara-
tion of September 14, 1973,' which commenced the round, many of the
agreements reflect the desire of the negotiators to deal with the particu-
larly troublesome problems created by non-tariff barriers (NTB's) and in-
ternational trade in agricultural commodities. Given the earlier preoccu-
pation with efforts to reduce tariff 'levels and the reluctance of the
European Economic Community (EEC) to negotiate issues affecting the
fledgling Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),' it is not surprising that
NTB's and agriculture were not dealt with sooner.
The objective of this article is to discuss briefly the multilateral codes
of conduct, bilateral trade concessions, and international commodity
agreements concluded during the MTN which will affect both imports
into and exports from the United States of agricultural commodities.
Since some of these measures serve to elaborate established principles of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and other mea-
sures which have been enshrined in U.S. municipal law through the vari-
ous provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA),' this article
analyzes a selected MTN measure, with reference to the relevant GATT
principles. Those portions of the MTN measure dealing explicitly with
international trade in agricultural commodities will be emphasized. The
analysis concludes with some observations about the provisions of the
TAA designed to implement the MTN measure domestically. A special
effort will be made throughout to call attention to those instances where
the provisions of the TAA change previously existing municipal law.
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1. Declaration of Ministers Approved At Tokyo on 14 September 1973, GATT BAsic
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs 19 (Supp. 20, 1974).
2. CAP consists of several measures designed to protect and promote the EEC agricul-
tural community.
3. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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II. MULTILATERAL CODES OF CONDUCT
Six major agreements designed to reduce or restrict the adverse con-
sequences of NTB's were produced during the course of the MTN.4 Four
of these will be discussed in this article: the Agreement on Government
Procurement (Government Procurement Code), 5 the Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code),6 the Agreement on Interpre-
tation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies/Countervailing Duties (CVD)
Code), 7 and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping Code).8 The other
measures are unquestionably of some importance, but it is unlikely they
will affect international trade in agricultural commodities quite as much
as the four to be addressed.
A. The Government Procurement Code
The laws, regulations, procedures, and practices of several nations
concerning government procurement of items for public use either require
or result in suppliers of domestic products being given preference over
suppliers of imported foreign products.9 The GATT generally prohibits
importing nations from engaging in discriminatory practices,1" but article
III, paragraph 5 explicitly sanctions discrimination of the sort mentioned.
Specifically, it states that the other provisions of article III, particularly
that of paragraph 2, which prohibits across-the-board discrimination
against foreign products in respect of all laws, regulations, and require-
ments affecting internal sale, offering for sale, or purchase," do not apply
in those instances where such laws, regulations, and requirements concern
government procurement of items for public use.'2 The effect of this is to
except current discriminatory government procurement practices from
4. Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS 3 (Supp. 26, 1980), also in AaENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, PART 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MTN AGREMENTS].
5. MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev.2 and Add. 1 [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT PROCURE-
MENT CODE], also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 69.
6. MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.5 [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS CODE], also in MTN
AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 211.
7. MTN/NTM/W/236 and Corr. 1 [hereinafter cited as SUBSIDIES/COuNTERVAILING Du-
TIES CODE], also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 259.
8. MTN/NTM/W/232 [hereinafter cited as ANTIDUMPING CODE], also in MTN AGREE-
ENTS, supra note 4, at 311.
9. One such law is the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10d (1976). For similar
foreign laws, regulations, procedures, and practices, see Comment, Eliminating Nontariff
Barriers to International Trade: The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 315, 328-33 (1980).
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. I, III, 61 Stat. 73
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade]. Article I contains the most-favored-nation obligation and article III con-
tains the national-treatment obligation.
11. Id. art. III, para. 2.
12. Id. art III, para. 5.
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the national treatment obligations of article III.
The Government Procurement Code, which takes effect on January
1, 1981,13 attempts to deal with the adverse effects caused by government
entities giving preference to domestic products when purchasing items for
public use. Part II of the Code states rather explicitly that all laws, regu-
lations, procedures, and practices of states parties shall accord products
originating within the customs territory of another state party treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to domestic producers and suppli-
ers."' In order to reduce or eliminate the discriminatory effect of proce-
dures and practices utilized in awarding contracts, the Code prescribes
specific rules for drafting specifications for items to be procured,' 5 giving
notice of proposed purchases," the preparation and submission of bids
and the awarding of contracts,"7 and the review of protests concerning
rejected bids. 8
While all of these provisions promise to increase the opportunities
for suppliers of imported foreign products to sell to government entities,
it must be noted that the provisions of the Code apply to contracts of
purchase by the government entities listed in Annex I,19 and then only
when such contracts involve an amount which equals or exceeds 150,000
SDR's' 0 (Special Drawing Rights)."' The provisions of the Code do not
apply to purchases by entities not listed in Annex I, purchases of less
than 150,000 SDR's, or purchases by regional or local government enti-
ties,"3 even though such purchases may be made with funds granted by
the national government." Nevertheless, states parties are required to in-
form all regional and local government entities, and all national govern-
ment entities not listed in Annex I, of the objectives, principles, and rules
of the Code and to draw attention to the benefits of the liberalization of
government procurement."
It has been estimated that the Government Procurement Code will
produce twenty billion dollars worth of new markets for exporters of
United States products.' 5 However, it seems unlikely that it will affect the
13. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Part IX(3).
14. Id. Part II(1)(a). Even though not so stated, this provision presumably refers to
"like" products.
15. Id. Part IV.
16. Id. Part V(3).
17. Id. Part V(14).
18. Id. Part VI.
19. Id. Part I(1)(c).
20. Id. Part I(1)(b).
21. A unit of measurement used by the International Monetary Fund. 150,000 SDRs
equals approximately $190,000.
22. This appears from the fact that such are not included in Part I(1)(c) of the Code.
23. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE AGREEMEmTS ACT, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st Seas. 130 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT].
24. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Part 1(2).
25. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 128.
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U.S. agricultural community to any significant degree. As previously men-
tioned, the provisions of the Code apply only to those national govern-
ment entities listed in Annex I. A perusal of the entities subsumed under
the various states parties listed in Annex I reveals that, in a great many
cases, entities involved in purchasing agricultural commodities have
explicitly excepted such purchases from their commitments under the
Code." For instance, purchases of agricultural products" by most minis-
tries of agriculture (including the U.S. Department of Agriculture) in
futherance of agricultural support programs or food programs have been
excepted.28 Similarly, purchases of agricultural supplies2 by some minis-
tries of defense (especially the U.S. Department of Defense) have been
excepted from the provisions of the Code. 0 Government purchases from
the U.S. agricultural community will thus remain relatively insulated and
new market opportunities abroad will exist only to the extent that states
parties have seen fit to subject national government entities which
purchase agricultural commodities to the liberalizing provisions of the
Government Procurement Code.
In implementing the obligations of the United States under Part II of
the Government Procurement Code, section 301 of the TAA3 ' authorizes
the President, effective January 1, 1981,33 to waive the applicability of all
laws, regulations, procedures, or practices regarding procurement for pub-
lic use which would, if applied, result in an imported foreign product be-
ing treated less favorably than a domestic product. 3 According to the
terms of section 301, however, the President is authorized to issue such
waivers only with respect to: a country which is a state party to the Gov-
ernment Procurement Code; " a non-major industrial country which,
though not a state party, will otherwise assume the obligations of the
26. For example, under the United States it reads: "Department of Agriculture (This
Agreement does not apply to procurement of agricultural products made in furtherance of
agricultural support programmes or human feeding programmes.)" GOVERNMENT PROCURE-
MENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I.
27. The term "agricultural product" is not defined in the Code. Does it mean "raw"
commodities or "processed" commodities?
28. See GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I, European Economic
Community, Part I, n.2. These items were obviously excepted because it would be absolutely
impossible to support domestic agriculture by purchasing foreign commodities.
29. In some places the term "food stuffs" is utilized. This difference in terms could lead
to dispute about what items have been excepted from the Code's coverage.
30. See GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I, European Economic
Community, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, United States. In' contradistinction to the
exception pertaining to support programs, the exception of agricultural supplies by minis-
tries of defense appears to be based on the notion that required purchases of foreign food
would imperil the ability of the military to operate during times of crises.
31. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301, 93 Stat. 236 (1979).
32. Id. § 309(2) 93 Stat. 242.
33. Though not explicitly stated, this presumably applies to "like" products.
34. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301(b)(1), 93 Stat. 236 (1979) (to be
codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(1)).
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Code;38 a non-major industrial country which, though not necessarily as-
suming the obligations of the Code, will provide competitive government
procurement opportunities to U.S. products; 6 or, a "least developed
country."'3 7 Furthermore, such waivers apply only to those entities and
products covered by the Government Procurement Code. In essence, this
provision has the effect of precluding the issuance of waivers involving
agricultural commodities purchased by the Department of Defense or the
Department of Agriculture since, as we have already seen, both have ex-
cepted from the Code their purchases of agricultural commodities.
Apparently, it is not anticipated that agricultural products 'should
forever remain beyond the coverage of the liberalizing provisions of the
Code. This is evidenced by the fact that section 304 of the TAA states
that in the renegotiations contemplated by Part IX, paragraph 6(b) of the
Code the President "shall" seek improved market access abroad with a
view to maximizing the economic benefits to the United States through
efforts to maintain and enlarge foreign markets for products of, inter alia,
U.S. agriculture." It is difficult, however, to imagine that foreign states
will acquiesce in U.S. efforts to obtain unilateral concessions designed to
benefit the U.S. agricultural community. More than likely, if the Code is
eventually altered so as to cover purchases of agricultural commodities,
this will come about as a result of concessions which will either have to be
mutual in nature or at least entail some quid pro quo.
B. The Standards Code
Product standards are perhaps the most troublesome of the various
NTB's affecting international trade in agricultural commodities. The
standards generally relate to quality, nutritive value, wholesomeness, and
other specifications which an item must meet before it may be shipped to
or sold in the importing country.3 9 Product standards often are designed
to attain some legitimate objective such as the protection of human,
animal, or plant health or safety. There have been instances, however,
where product standards have been deliberately used to obstruct the free
flow of goods in international commerce.
4 0
Certain provisions of the GATT would seem to prohibit the use of
35. Id. § 301(b)(2), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(2)).
36. Id. § 301(b)(3), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(3)).
37. Id. § 301(b)(4), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(4)).
38. Specifically, § 304(a) of the Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 238
(1979), states in pertinent part: "The President shall seek in ... renegotiations ... more
open and equitable market access abroad ... with the overall goal of maximizing the eco-
nomic benefit to the United States through maintaining and enlarging foreign markets for
products of United States agriculture .
39. See generally United States Cotton Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1976); United
States Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87h (1976); Naval Stores Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 91-99
(1976); Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1976); Plant Quarantine Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976); Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1976).
40. Technical Analysis of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 12 L. & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 179, 183 (1980).
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standards in a fashion which discriminate between or against foreign
trading partners. Specifically, article I provides that the treatment which
is accorded to products imported from the territory of one state party
shall also be accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products
imported from the territory of all other states parties.4' Article III, para-
graph 4, goes even further and provides that products imported from the
territory of any state party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like domestic products. 42 Neither of these two pro-
visions, however, addresses standards which, though not discriminating
between or against foreign trading partners, actually have the effect of
erecting barriers to international trade. In short, articles I and III of the
GATT proscribe discriminatory standards but say nothing of nondiscrim-
inatory standards which obstruct international trade.
The Standards Code,48 effective January 1, 1980,4 4 reiterates the obli-
gations extant in the opening provisions of the GATT by stating that
technical regulations, standards,45 testing methods and procedures,"' and
certification systems shall accord products imported from the territory of
a state party no less favorable treatment than that accorded to like prod-
ucts of domestic origin or like products imported from the territory of
another state party.4" Of much greater significance than this nondiscrimi-
natory obligation, article 2.1 of the Code provides that states parties shall
ensure that technical regulations, standards, 48 and certification systems4'
are not prepared or adopted "with a view to creating obstacles to interna-
tional trade" or applied so as to create "unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade." In essence, unlike GATT, article 2.1 of the Standards Code
proscribes the adoption of standards for the purpose of intentionally ob-
structing international trade as well as the application of standards
which, though not adopted with such an intention in mind, have the ef-
fect of unnecessarily obstructing international trade. Since the term "un-
necessary" is not defined, it would seem that whether a standard unnec-
essarily obstructs international trade turns upon an evaluation of factors
such as the nature of the standard itself, the extent of the impact of the
standard on international trade, the importance of the objective which
the standard seeks to attain, and the availability of equally efficacious yet
less restrictive alternative methods of accomplishing the same objective.'0
In addition to the foregoing, the Code requires states parties,
"[wiherever appropriate," to state "technical regulations and standards in
41. This is known as the most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation.
42. This is known as the national treatment obligation.
43. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6.
44. Id. art. 15.5.
45. Id. art. 2.1.
46. Id. art. 5.1.
47. Id. art. 7.2.
48. Id. art. 2.1.
49. Id. art. 7.1.
50. See text accompanying notes 81 and 82 infra.
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terms of performance rather that design or descriptive characteristics."' 1
Further, states parties are required-except where inappropriate for rea-
sons of national security, prevention of deceptive practices, or protection
of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environ-
ment-to use relevant international standards as a basis for standards of
central government bodies.62 If relevant international standards do not
exist and technical regulations or standards are being considered which
may have a significant impact on trade of other states parties, then the
state party interested in promulgating such regulations or standards is
required to publish the proposal for comment, notify all states parties
through the GATT Secretariat of the products to be covered, provide
copies of the proposal to states parties upon request, and allow a reason-
able time during which states parties may submit written comments on
the proposal.68 Article 7.3 makes the same rulemaking procedure applica-
ble to certification systems." Finally, the Code obligates each state party
to accept, "whenever possible," the results of tests conducted by relevant
entities located in other states parties,56 and to establish an "enquiry
point" for answering questions from entities located in other states par-
ties concerning adopted or proposed technical regulations, standards, or
certification."
Unlike the Government Procurement Code, the provisions of the
Standards Code apply to both industrial and agricultural products.6 7
Since they are not explicitly limited, it would appear that the provisions
of the Code govern mandatory as well as voluntary technical regulations,
standards, and certifications systems." The Code distinguishes between
standards-related activities engaged in by central government bodies6"
and those engaged in by local1' or nongovernmental bodies. 6' Specifically,
while central government bodies are required to adhere to the obligations
of the Code, local or nongovernmental bodies are not. However, central
government bodies are obligated to take "such reasonable measures as
may be available" to ensure that local and nongovernmental bodies abide
by the terms of the Code.62 If such efforts prove unsuccessful, it would
appear that states parties adversely affected might be entitled to subject
the state party in whose territory the local or nongovernmental body is
located to international dispute resolution proceedings spelled out in the
51. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6, art. 2.4.
52. Id. art. 2.2.
53. Id. art. 2.5.
54. Id. art. 7.3.
55. Id. art. 5.2.
56. Id. art. 10.1.
57. Id. art. 1.3.
58. SENATE FINANCE CoMm. REPORT, supra note 23, at 149.
59. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6, Annex I, art. 6.
60. Id. Annex I, art. 7.
61. Id. Annex I, art. 8.
62. Id. art. 3.
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Code and, if appropriate, legitimate retaliation."
Articles 13 and 14 establish the procedures for resolving disputes
arising under the provisions of the Code. Basically, these articles provide
for the creation of a Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade composed
of representatives of each state party to the Code.6 4 Disputes incapable of
being resolved by the states concerned" can be referred to the Commit-
tee, which shall meet within thirty days of a request received from any
party to the dispute.es Investigations of the matter in dispute shall pro-
ceed expeditiously and in the case of perishable (for example, agricul-
tural) products "in the most expeditious manner possible with a view to
facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution within three months of the
request for the Committee investigation." ' The Committee will make
"every effort" to resolve within a twelve month period disputes affecting
products with a definite crop cycle of twelve months." The Committee
may enforce its decisions concerning matters in dispute by authorizing
the suspension of obligations established by the Code with respect to any
party.69
Article 14.2570 provides that any state party who "considers that obli-
gations under this Agreement are being circumvented" by the drafting of
standards-related requirements in terms of processes and production
methods (PPM), rather than product characteristics, is entitled to invoke
the dispute settlement procedures set out in articles 13 and 14. In es-
sence, this provision would seem to permit a party to a dispute to request
the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to exercise jurisdiction
over the matter whenever the party itself "considers" that circumvention
is taking place. The jurisdictional standard would appear to be purely
subjective and based totally on the perception of the aggrieved party.
Once the Committee has assumed jurisdiction, it would seem that if a
63. The language of article 5.1 of the Code somewhat confuses this point, however.
Since it appears only to fix an obligation on central government bodies (states parties) to
avoid violations with respect to testing methods and procedures, it might be argued that
violations committed by local or nongovernmental bodies are not actionable under the Code.
On the other hand, to the extent that article 2.1 states the controlling principle applicable to
all sorts of standards-related activities, it would appear to make violations of article 5.1 by
local or nongovernmental bodies actionable.
64. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6, art. 13.1.
65. Id. art. 14.2.
66. Id. art. 14.4.
67. Id. art. 14.6.
68. Id. art. 14.7.
69. Id. art. 14.21.
70. In view of the fact that it was not definitively settled until December of 1978 that
standards for agricultural products would be covered by the Code, most of the Code's provi-
sions are drafted in language reflecting a preoccupation with industrial products. Given the
fact that many of the standards applicable to agricultural products are drafted in terms of
processes and production methods (PPM), rather than product characteristics as is the case
with industrial goods, there is some question as to whether the Code will effectively restrain
the use of standards as an NTB to international trade in agricultural commodities. It would
appear, however, that article 14.25 should go a long way toward accomplishing such a result.
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circumvention is in fact occurring, then it could, where appropriate, au-
thorize the retaliatory suspension of obligations under the Code.71
The provisions of the Standards Code are implemented domestically
through Title IV of the TAA. Specifically, section 402 of the TAA states
that federal agencies are prohibited from engaging in standards-related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. No comparable prohibition exists with respect to stan-
dards-related activities of state agencies and private persons.7' Stan-
dards-related activities which create unnecessary obstacles include: tests
or test methods subjecting imported products to treatment less favorable
than that accorded to like domestic or imported products;7 ' domestic
standards which fail to take into consideration relevant international
standards;74 domestic standards based on design rather than performance
criteria;75 and certification systems which fail to give foreign suppliers
access on the same basis as suppliers of like domestic or imported
products.7 1
In addition to these obstacles, which are considered per se unneces-
sary, it would appear that there are other standards-related activities
which might well be considered violative of Title IV. Specifically, section
401 intimates that any standards-related activity having a great enough
impact on the foreign commerce of the United States, which does not
have as its demonstrable purpose the attainment of a legitimate domestic
objective77 or which operates to exclude imported products that fully
meet such an objective, may also be viewed as creating an unnecessary
obstacle.7 8 The explicit language of section 401 indicates that legitimate
domestic objectives include "the protection of legitimate health or safety,
essential security, environmental, or consumer interest. . . ."9 Stan-
dards-related activities unquestionably designed to accomplish some le-
gitimate domestic objective may still be found to create an unnecessary
obstacle to foreign commerce if they operate to exclude imported prod-
ucts which fully meet the legitimate objective.8 0
71. This would seem to result from the broad language in article 14.2, which speaks of
"any benefit" under the Code being "nullified or impaired" and the fact that article 14.25
invokes the dispute settlement procedures set out in the Code. The retaliatory suspension of
obligations under the Code is provided for in article 14.21 which authorizes the Committee
to suspend "the application of obligations including those in Articles 5 to 9, in order to
restore mutual economic advantage and balance of rights and obligations."
72. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 403, 93 Stat. 243 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 2533).
73. Id. § 402(1), 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(1)).
74. Id. § 402(2), 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(2)).
75. Id. § 402(3), 93 Stat. 243 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(3)).
76. Id. § 402(4), 93 Stat. 243 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(4)).
77. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 152.
78. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 40, 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19
U.S.C. § 2531).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The approach intimated in section 401 comports with the multi-
factor-oriented configurative analysis suggested for determining whether,
under article 2.1 of the Code, some standards-related activity creates an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. 1 More precisely, it will be
recalled that since the Code does not define "unnecessary," it was sug-
gested earlier that in order to determine whether a standards-related ac-
tivity creates an unnecessary obstacle to international trade, one should
look at a host of factors associated with the activity itself and its impact
on international trade. Standards-related activities are to be designed to
accomplish legitimate domestic objectives, such as legitimate health and
safety, essential security, environmental or consumer interests, and yet to
avoid excluding products which fully meet any such objective. Thus it
appears that the Congress recognizes that many factors considered during
the course of evaluating standards-related activities under article 2.1 of
the Code should also receive consideration when evaluating standards-re-
lated activities undertaken pursuant to U.S. municipal law. The value of
such an approach would seem to be in the liberalization of international
trade. The requirement that a health and safety standards-related activ-
ity be designed to protect "legitimate" health and safety interests would
indicate that standards establishing unreasonably high health and safety
levels might create unnecessary obstacles in violation of section 402 if the
impact on foreign commerce of the United States is great enough."2 Simi-
larly, a standards-related activity which has an indiscriminate impact on
international trade, resulting in the exclusion of wholesome products,
might also be of questionable validity. In each case it would appear that
the concern is to strike a balance between the protection of legitimate
domestic interests and the liberalization of international trade.
Section 414 of the TAA requires the Secretary of Commerce to estab-
lish a standards information center within the Department of Com-
merce.88 This assures compliance with article 10 of the Standards Code
which requires that each state party establish an "enquiry point" for the
collection and dissemination of information concerning technical regula-
tions, standards, or certification systems which have been adopted or pro-
posed within the territory of the state party. Further, with the standards
information center serving as the national collection and dissemination
facility for standards-related information, whether public or private, do-
mestic or foreign, or international, regional, or local, entities located in
the United States should have ready access to materials which cast light
on all types of standards-related activities affecting the foreign commerce
of the United States."
If a federal agency engages in some standards-related activity which
81. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
82. This, of course, assumes that there is some impact on international trade.
83. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 414(a), 93 Stat. 245 (1979) (to be codi-
fied in 19 U.S.C. § 2544).
84. Id. § 414(b), 93 Stat. 245 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2544(b)).
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creates an unnecessary obstacle to international commerce or violates
some provision of the Standards Code, then any state party to the Code
may make a "representation" to the Special Representative for Trade Ne-
gotiations so long as it can provide some reasonable indication that the
standards-related activity is having a significant trade effect. 8  Since sec-
tion 421 speaks only of standards-related activities "engaged in within
the United States," it would appear that representations could also be
made with respect to activities by state agencies or private persons. Title
IV does not provide for the receipt of representations from domestic enti-
ties interested in assuring that federal agencies comply with the TAA's
proscription of standards-related activities which create unnecessary ob-
stacles to foreign commerce." Alleged violations of the Standards Code
by other states parties which impact U.S. commerce may be remedied in
two distinct fashions. First, in accordance with articles 13 and 14 of the
Code, the United States may proceed through international channels, in-
cluding the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.87 Second, any in-
terested domestic person may petition the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations" to request the President to take whatever actions
are necessary under section 301 of the Trade Act of 197489 to enforce the
rights of the United States under the Code." These enforcement provi-
sions should go a long way toward obtaining the benefits of efforts to re-
duce or eliminate standards-related activities as an effective NTB.
C. The Subsidies/Countervailing Duties (CVD) Code
The granting of subsidies has been described as one of the most per-
nicious practices in international trade. 1 Since subsidies are frequently
used by governments to support the domestic agricultural community, it
is only fitting that some discussion in this article be devoted to the modi-
fications in the rules governing the use of subsidies and the circumstances
under which countervailing action is permissible.
The GATT does not proscribe the utilization of subsidies in all in-
stances. Rather, it simply provides guidelines which must be followed if
subsidies are to be consonant with accepted international principles. Spe-
cifically, article XVI states that export subsidies are permitted on pri-
mary products-including agricultural commodities-so long as they do
not result in the subsidizing state obtaining more than an equitable share
of the world export trade in such product, with account being taken of
trade during a previous representative period.92 Export subsidies on non-
85. Id. § 422, 93 Stat. 247 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2552).
86. Id. § 421, 93 Stat. 247 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2551).
87. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
88. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 296 (1979) (amending 19
U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)).
89. Id. § 901, 93 Stat. 295 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976)).
90. Id. § 424(b), 93 Stat. 248 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. 2554(b)).
91. SENATE FINANCE Comm. RzPolr, supra note 23, at 37.
92. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. XVI, para. 3, as
amended by Protocol Amending The Preamble and Parts H and m of the General Agree-
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primary products are permitted so long as they do not result in the subsi-
dized product being sold in the importing country at a price below the
domestic market price of like domestic products.'3 Article XVI also pro-
vides that states parties granting any form of subsidy which operates to
increase exports or decrease imports must notify other states parties of
the nature and extent of the subsidy." If such subsidy causes or threatens
to cause "serious prejudice" to the interests of another state party, then
the subsidizing state must, upon request, consult with the affected state
with a view to limiting the subsidization."
The Subsidies/CVD Code, effective January 1, 1980, and applicable
only between states parties, changes the GATT rules on subsidies in three
pertinent respects. First, article 9 of the Code specifically prohibits states
parties from granting export subsidies on non-primary products." The
prohibition no longer turns on whether subsidization results in the prod-
uct being sold at a price below the domestic market price of like domestic
products. Second, while export subsidies on primary products continue to
be permitted, they are compatible with the obligations of article 10 of the
Code only so long as they neither result in the subsidizing state obtaining
more than an equitable share of the world export trade in such product,97
or the subsidized product being sold at prices materially below those of
other suppliers to the same market.'8 The prohibition of subsidies result-
ing in the subsidized product being sold at prices materially below those
of other suppliers is new and should be subject to less dispute than the
earlier GATT standard. Also new is a provision which attempts to define
the phrases "equitable share of world export trade" and "previous repre-
sentative period."" Third, article 12 provides that states parties granting
any form of subsidy which causes "injury" to the domestic industry of
another state party or "nullification or impairment of benefits" accruing
to that state party under the GATT must, upon request, enter into con-
sultations with the affected states as soon as possible so that they can
achieve a mutually satisfactory solution. 1°° Though article 12 also requires
consultations whenever the subsidy causes "serious prejudice" to the in-
terests of another state party, it would appear that the Code increases
access to the kind of consultation mechanism initially set out in article
XVI of the GATT. Violations of any of the obligations of the Code which
are not satisfactorily resolved may result in the Committee of Signato-
mert On Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S.
168.
93. Id. art. XVI, para. 4.
94. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. XVI, para. 1.
95. Id.
96. SUnMMSD/COUNMRVAING DuTa CODE, supra note 7, art. 9.
97. Id. art. 10(1).
98. Id. art. 10(3).
99. Id. art. 10(2).
100. Id. art. 12.
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ries"'I making "recommendations to the parties as may be appropriate"
and, if such recommendations are not followed, authorizing counter-
measures as may be appropriate.
1 0
'
Traditionally, whenever states have subsidized the export of products
to make them more attractive to foreign purchasers, the country of im-
portation has responded by imposing a CVD equal to the amount of the
subsidy. Article VI of the GATT states the principles applicable to the
imposition of such CVD's. In essence, article VI provides that a CVD may
be imposed on an imported product only if it can be demonstrated that a
subsidy is being bestowed on the manufacture, production, or exportation
of the product and that such subsidization is causing or threatening to
cause material injury to a domestic industry or materially retarding the
establishment of such an industry.' Though it would seem that article
VI establishes a relatively precise principle, in practice it has not served
to promote a great deal of uniformity in the imposition of CVD's by the
various states parties to the GATT.
The provisions of the Subsidies/CVD Code applicable to the imposi-
tion of CVD's on products imported from other states parties are
designed to correct this deficiency. Specifically, notwithstanding the fact
that states parties to the GATT may have had some perfectly legitimate
reasons in the past for not complying with the terms of article VI when
assessing CVD's,104 the Code now makes it eminently clear that a CVD
may be imposed on a product imported from another state party only
after it has been demonstrated that the product is being subsidized and
that this results in material injury to a domestic industry. 10° Further, arti-
cles 2 through 5 of the Code establish extensive procedural requirements
incident to the imposition of CVD's and article 6 enumerates factors to be
considered when attempting to determine whether a domestic industry is
being materially injured. Article 6 states essentially that injury should be
determined by examining the volume of imports and the effects of such
on domestic prices of like products, as well as the consequent impact of
such imports on domestic producers of like products. With particular re-
spect to agricultural products, article 6(3) provides that when examining
the impact on domestic producers, special consideration should be given
to determining whether the economic conditions created by the subsi-
dized imports have increased the burden on government support pro-
grams. The mere fact that producers of agricultural products are not ex-
periencing a decline in output, sales, market share, or productivity does
not alone indicate that imported agricultural commodities benefitting
101. Id. art. 16.
102. Id. art. 13(4).
103. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. VI.
104. Under the Protocol of Provisional Application to the GATT, states parties to that
agreement were permitted to continue to operate under antedating municipal laws inconsis-
tent with the principles stated in GATT.
105. SUSrMMs/CouNMVMUNo Duri COD, supra note 7, art. 1.
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from subsidies are not having any impact on the domestic industry. The
absence of a decline in any of these areas may be attributable to in-
creased government price support activity and such activity may be indic-
ative of injury warranting imposition of a CVD. Article 4(1) of the Code,
however, makes it clear that the imposition of a CVD on agricultural
products, or any other type of imported item, is not mandatory.
The provisions of the Subsidies/CVD Code are implemented domes-
tically by title I of the TAA, which adds a new title VII to the Tariff Act
of 1 9 3 0 .1°6 However, since there would be serious questions about the leg-
islative jurisdiction, not to mention the efficacy and political propriety, of
Congress enacting a statute designed to proscribe foreign entities from
granting subsidies on products imported into the United States, title I of
the TAA merely purports to establish when subsidies will warrant the
imposition of a CVD and does not provide for the prohibition of subsidies
granted by foreign entities.
Title I of the TAA, 107 apart from establishing extensive procedural
requirements which must be followed whenever a CVD is to be imposed,
provides for countervailing action only in those instances where an im-
ported product is benefitting from a subsidy which is resulting in material
injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry producing like
products.'" The application of the standard enunciated in title I is lim-
ited to those products imported from countries which are states parties to
the Code or which extend the benefits of the Code to products imported
from the United States.1 0' Products imported from the territory of other
countries will not be accorded such treatment but will remain subject to
CVD's imposed pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.110 In
essence, this means that products imported from countries which are not
states parties to the Code or do not extend the benefits of the Code to
products imported from the United States will continue to be subject to
CVD's without regard to whether subsidization is resulting in material
injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry.11 This dichot-
omy between treatment accorded products imported from countries
which adhere to the obligations of the Code and products imported from
all other countries is consistent with the commitments of the United
States under both the Subsidies/CVD Code and the GATT.1 2
In explication of the standard stated in title I of the TAA, section
106. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 150 (1979) (amending 19
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976)).
107. Id. §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 150-93 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677(g)).
108. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 150 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671).
109. Id.
110. Id. See also Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
111. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 151 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c)). SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 43-44.
112. Article 1 of the Code makes it clear that the provisions of the Code apply'only
between States Parties. Other states will continue to be treated under section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
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771 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by title I, defines several pertinent
terms. Specifically, the term "subsidy" is defined as including those ex-
port subsidies described in Annex A of the Code and certain enumerated
domestic subsidies paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manu-
facture, production, or export of any product." The term "domestic in-
dustry" is defined as including domestic producers as a whole, producers
whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domes-
tic production, and, in certain limited situations, regional producers.1 "
Perhaps most importantly, however, the term "material injury" is defined
as harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.11' 6 In
determining whether the requisites of this definition have been satisfied,
section 771 directs that consideration be taken of the volume of imports,
the effect of such imports on domestic prices of like products, and the
impact of such imports on domestic producers. s
Of particular interest to this discussion, section 771 provides, consis-
tent with article (3) of the Code, that when attempting to determine
whether imports of subsidized agricultural products are causing material
injury, consideration "shall" be given to whether there has been any in-
creased burden on government income or price support programs.'1 7 As a
corollary, section 771 states further that it "shall not" be determined that
there is no material injury or threat of material injury to domestic pro-
ducers of like agricultural products merely because the prevailing market
price is at or above the minimum support price." 8 Both principles should
prove significantly helpful in attempting to deal with the difficulties inci-
dent to efforts to determine whether producers of supported agricultural
products are being injured by imported agricultural products.11 '
D. The Antidumping Code
Frequently, imported products are sold in the country of importation
at prices below their fair value or home market price. When such sales
cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry, or re-
tard materially the establishment of such an industry, article VI of the
GATT entitles the country of importation to assess a duty on such prod-
ucts equal to the difference between the fair value and the price at which
the products are actually being sold.120 This duty, known as a dumping
duty, is designed to increase the price of the imported product to a more
representative level thereby averting the economic dislocations associated
with unfair price advantage.
113. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 177 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)).
114. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 176 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)).
115. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 178 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 179 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(D)(ii)).
118. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 179 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(D)(i)).
119. SENATE FINANCE Comm. REPoir, supra note 23, at 87-88.
120. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. VI.
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The Antidumping Code, recently completed in Geneva, 1 reiterates
the GATT standard for the imposition of dumping duties by stating that
such duties may not be imposed unless the requisites of article VI of the
GATT have been satisfied.1 2 2 In addition, articles 3 and 4 of the Code go
further than article VI of the GATT and attempt to suggest definitions
for both material injury and domestic industry. These definitions are es-
sentially identical to those used in the Subsidies/CVD Code. In one re-
spect, however, the definition of material injury in article 3 differs from
that in article 6 of the Subsidies/CVD Code. Specifically, it will be recal-
led that article 6(3) of the Subsidies/CVD Code states that whenever at-
tempting to determine whether domestic producers of agricultural prod-
ucts have suffered material injury, consideration should be given to
whether the importation of the subsidized agricultural products has in-
creased the burden on government support programs. Article 3 of the An-
tidumping Code contains no reference to special factors deserving consid-
eration when the dumped products are agricultural. It should be noted,
however, that by stating that the definition of material injury does not
list all the factors to be examined, the last sentence of article 3(3) would
seem to indicate that the impact of dumping on government support pro-
grams may be considered in determining whether material injury exists.
The provisions of the Antidumping Code, effective January 1,
1980,128 are implemented domestically by title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930, as added by title I of the TAA. As we have seen previously, title VII
also implements the Subsidies/CVD Code. Section 731 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 provides, consistent with the Antidumping Code, that imported
products sold or likely to be sold at less than fair value-that is, normal
value or home market price-are subject to dumping duties if such sales
result in material injury or threat of material injury to a domestic indus-
try or retard materially the establishment of such an industry. 2 4 In most
respects this standard is identical to that used pursuant to section 701
when determining whether the imposition of a CVD is warranted. More
precisely, both standards refer to the fact that the improper activity must
result in or threaten to result in material injury to a domestic industry.
For this very reason, the terms "material injury" and "domestic industry"
as used in that portion of title VII dealing with the imposition of dump-
ing duties have the same meaning as when used in that portion dealing
with the imposition of CVD's.
One important consequence proceeds from the fact that the term
"material injury" is given the same meaning under section 731 of the
121. During the Kennedy Round of the MTN an Antidumping Code was formulated.
Subsequently, Congress enacted municipal measures severely restricting the significance of
that Code for the United States.
122. ANTIDUMPING CODE, supra note 8, art. 1.
123. Id. art. 16(4).
124. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 162 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
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Tariff Act of 1930 as it is under section 701 dealing with CVD's. Section
731 states that whenever imported agricultural products are the concern,
consideration "shall" be given to whether imports of such products have
resulted in any increased burden on government income or price support
programs. Thus it is made explicitly clear that even though article 3 of
the Code does not require that consideration be taken of such concerns,
section 731 does. This would seem to rectify the omission which was pre-
viously alluded to in the language of article 3 of the Code, thus eliminat-
ing questions that might arise over the discrepancy between material in-
jury in the case of CVD's and material injury in the case of antidumping.
Apart from this, two other matters deserve consideration before mov-
ing to a discussion of the bilateral trade concessions granted by the
United States during the course of the Tokyo Round of the MTN. First,
it would appear that even though section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930
uses the term "material ' 125 to describe the type of injury requisite to the
imposition of a dumping duty, Congress' expectation is that this should
not increase the quantum of injury one is required to show over what was
previously required under section 202 of the Antidumping Act of 1921.1'*
That former provision did not contain the adjective "material" but was
applied in a fashion equally as strict as section 731.127 Second, the stan-
dard enunciated in article VI of the GATT and reaffirmed in the Antimp-
ing Code, unlike that pronounced in the Subsidies/CVD Code, applies to
products imported from all countries, including those which are not states
parties to the Code. It is uncertain exactly why this distinction exists.
The two most probable reasons, however, are that section 731 is seen
largely as a re-enactment of the basic standard in section 202 of the An-
tidumping Act-a standard of general applicability-and that the lan-
guage in article 1 of the Antidumping Code might very well require such a
result. In particular, article 1 of the Antidumping Code does not provide
for application only between states parties. On the other hand, it is per-
fectly clear that the liberal treatment accorded by article 1 of the Subsi-
dies/CVD Code is limited to states parties.
III. BILATERAL TRADE CONCESSIONS
The bilateral trade concessions concerning agriculture granted by the
United States during the recent round of trade negotiations concluded in
Geneva are reflected in a host of agreements on meat, chocolate crumb,
and cheese. While each agreement has indisputable importance to the
parties affected, only the agreements on cheese merit more than passing
reference in this brief survey.
A. Agreements on Meat
Under the Meat Import Act of 1964,'"* and the voluntary restraint
125. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 178 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)).
126. 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
127. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 87.
128. Meat Import Act, Pub. L. No. 88-482, 78 Stat. 594 (1964) (codified in 19 U.S.C.
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agreements negotiated under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of
1956,129 the United States has for years managed to limit the amount of
foreign meat entering the country. In response to requests and conces-
sions from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada during the recent trade
negotiations, the United States entered into bilateral agreements affect-
ing foreign meat importation.8 0 These agreements do two things: increase
the access level for all suppliers of foreign beef and reduce the duty on
certain high quality foreign beef imported from Canada.1 3 1 More pre-
cisely, the agreements with Australia and New Zealand commit the
United States to a global access level of no less than 1.2 billion pounds of
beef annually, 82 and the agreement with Canada provides that the
United States will reduce the duty on high quality control cuts of beef
from ten to four percent.188
B. Agreements on Chocolate Crumb
Chocolate crumb is basically chocolate containing up to approxi-
mately nine percent butterfat. Quotas have existed on chocolate crumb
for some time, since imports might displace significant quantities of do-
mestic butterfats, thus depressing the domestic price support pro-
grams.1 34 The agreements negotiated in Geneva with Australia and New
Zealand are designed to permit these countries to participate with Ire-
land, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands in supplying chocolate
crumb to the United States. Specifically, the agreement with Australia
entitles it to supply 4.4 million pounds to the United States annually.8 5
The agreement with New Zealand entitles it to supply 2.2 million pounds
annually. " " While the amount granted New Zealand is admittedly small,
the fact that New Zealand is granted a specifically assigned quota share
permits it to participate in country of origin adjustments made as a result
of any of the other four countries being incapable of supplying their own
quota share. Section 703187 of the TAA implements the provisions of the
two agreements on chocolate crumb.
C. Agreements on Cheese
Under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,188 the
President is authorized to issue proclamations limiting the amount of any
§ 1202, sched. 1, pt. 2 (1976)).
129. 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1976).
130. MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 460, 510.
131. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 192-93.
132. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 704, 93 Stat. 273 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
133. Id. § 506, 93 Stat. 252 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sched. 1, pt. 2).
134. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP.
No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE COMM. REPORT].
135. Id. at 142.
136. Id.
137. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 703, 93 Stat. 272 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 app. note).
138. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1976).
VOL. 10:89
TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
agricultural product imported into the United States whenever the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that the importation
of any such product is interfering with a domestic price support program.
Modifications increasing or decreasing the limitation so proclaimed may
be made following similar consideration by the ITC.
Pursuant to section 22, the United States has long maintained a
quota limiting the amount of imported cheese which may enter the coun-
try annually. However, since the quota on imported cheese essentially was
designed to protect domestic dairy products benefitting from price sup-
port programs, the United States has largely refrained from limiting the
importation of cheese not jeopardizing such programs. This is perhaps
best indicated by the fact that the quota on imported cheese existing
prior to the implementation of the results of the Tokyo Round did not
cover certain foreign specialty cheeses (goat's milk and sheep's milk
cheese, and certain soft-ripened cow's milk cheese) or imported cheese
priced higher than the support price for domestic cheddar cheese ($1.16/
lb.) plus seven cents per pound-a figure known as the "price-break. '" 1 ' 9
In 1978 only about fifty percent of the roughly 100,000 metric tons of
imported cheese entering the United States was subject to the quota.1 40
During the recent trade negotiations the United States concluded bi-
lateral agreements on cheese with Austria, Norway, Finland, Israel, New
Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, Australia, Ar-
gentina, and the EEC.1"' Each of these agreements commits the United
States to permit the importation of a specified amount of cheese annu-
ally. The sum of the amounts stated in each of the agreements represents
approximately all the quota and above price-break cheese imported dur-
ing 1978, plus a small increase conceded by the United States during the
course of the negotiations. 142 In addition, each of the agreements, with the
exception of those with Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Argentina, ' 8
commits the United States to refrain from imposing CVD's on any of the
cheese supplied in satisfaction of the amounts permitted under the agree-
ments. In return for these commitments the United States received writ-
ten assurances from the countries involved that they would not grant sub-
sidies on such cheese in a manner which would result in the undercutting
of the domestic wholesale price of like domestic cheese.144
The commitments to permit the importation of a specified amount of
cheese annually are implemented domestically by section 701 of the
TAA.' 45 Section 701 directs the President to issue a proclamation, to be
139. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 193-94.
140. HousE COMM. REPORT, supra note 134, at 135.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 191.
144. See, e.g., the agreement with the EEC in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 417,
paras. 3, 4.
145. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 701, 93 Stat. 268 (1979) (to be codified
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considered as issued under section 22, limiting the amount of quota
cheese which may enter the United States annually to an amount of not
more than 111,000 metric tons. The need for such a Congressional direc-
tive existed for two distinct reasons. First, the quota level under U.S. law
in 1978 and 1979 was considerably lower than the quota level needed in
order to permit the United States to comply fully with the thirteen bilat-
eral agreements on cheese concluded in Geneva. And second, it was un-
clear whether the time consuming consultations with the ITC required by
section 22 would produce the kind of result necessary to authorize the
President to issue an amending proclamation increasing the quota level
above that then existing. In order to bring the quota level under U.S. law
into line with the international commitments of the United States, avert
potential problems accompanying consultations with the ITC, and at the
same time assure the domestic dairy industry of the continuing viability
of section 22, Congress simply required the issuance of a proclamation
establishing a quota roughly equal to the sum of the amounts specified in
all of the bilateral agreements. 46 Presumably, interest in protecting the
price support programs received some consideration by Congress prior to
its approval and implementation of the bilateral agreements entered into
by the executive branch.
Apart from altering the method by which quotas on cheese have tra-
ditionally been established, section 701 changes the cheese quota system
in another significant respect. Since 1968 imported cheese priced higher
than the price-break has been permitted to enter the United States free
of quota. By directing the issuance of a proclamation limiting the amount
of quota cheese which may enter the United States annually and then
defining the term "quota cheese" without reference to any support price
figure, 47 section 701 effectively eliminates the price-break. As a result,
rather than having a system comprised of quota cheese, above price-break
cheese, and non-quota cheese, section 701 creates a system comprised of
only quota cheese and non-quota cheese. This change, which will bring
about eighty-five percent of all cheese imported into the U.S. within the
quota system, represents concern with projected increases in importations
of above price-break cheese. The only cheese now entitled to enter the
United States free of quota will be the specialty cheese.14 8
The commitments of the United States to refrain from imposing
CVD's on quota cheese imported from countries which have obligated
themselves not to undercut the domestic wholesale price of like domestic
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
146. If one looks closely at figures, it is apparent that only approximately 109,000 of the
111,000 metric tons authorized by Congress to be allocated had, as of August 1, 1980, actu-
ally been allocated.
147. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 701(c), 93 Stat. 269 (1979) (to be
codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
148. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 194-95.
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cheese are implemented by section 702(0 of the TAA." 9 In view of the
fact that section 702(f) applies only to quota cheese imported from coun-
tries which have agreed not to engage in price-undercutting, nothing in
the TAA would seem to prohibit the imposition of CVD's on items of
non-quota cheese or items of quota cheese imported from countries, such
as Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Argentina, which have not obli-
gated themselves to avoid price undercutting. However, before CVD's
may be imposed in such cases, it must at least be demonstrated that the
imported cheese is benefitting from a subsidy. Whether the subsidy must
also cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry
will depend upon whether section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or section
701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by title I of the TAA, applies.
The commitment to refrain from imposing CVD's on quota cheese
imported from countries agreeing not to engage in price undercutting
does not leave the domestic dairy industry subject to foreign depredation.
Subsections (b) through (e) of section 702 provide the President authority
to penalize transgressions of the international obligations to avoid sales
undercutting the domestic wholesale price of like domestic cheese. Specif-
ically, these subsections provide that the President may impose fees or
quantitative limitations on subsidized quota cheese imported into the
United States whenever such cheese is being offered for sale at a duty-
paid wholesale price below the domestic wholesale market price of similar
domestic cheese. Fees imposed pursuant to this authority are clearly dis-
tinct from CVD's in that they do not exceed what is necessary to elimi-
nate the price undercutting. Furthermore, it would appear that they are
consonant with the bilateral agreements, since the bilaterals do not pro-
hibit the United States from penalizing violations of the international ob-
ligations to avoid price undercutting.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
Two international commodity agreements, both effective January 1,
1980, deserve passing consideration in concluding this brief survey of the
results.of the Tokyo Round of the MTN which affect international trade
in agricultural commodities. These agreements are the Arrangement Re-
garding Bovine Meat 50 and the International Dairy Arrangement."5 " In
general, both agreements are designed primarily to establish an informa-
tional and consultative network. Attached to the International Dairy Ar-
rangement, however, are three protocols containing substantive economic
provisions.
A. Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat (ARBM)
The purpose of the ARBM, which covers trade in live bovine ani-
mals, as well as fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, dried, smoked, and prepared
149. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 702, 93 Stat. 269 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
150. MTN/ME/8, also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 585.
151. MTN/DP/8, also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 339.
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or preserved meat and edible offals of bovine animals,1 2 is to facilitate
the expansion, liberalization, and stability of the international meat and
livestock market. 5 8 This purpose is to be accomplished by assisting in the
progressive dismantling of obstacles and restrictions to world trade in bo-
vine meat and live animals.'
The fundamental instrument established by the ARBM to satisfy its
stated purpose is the International Meat Council. 5' The Council is to be
comprised of representatives from all states parties to the agreement and
shall meet at least twice each year or at any other time requested by its
chairman upon his own initiative or following the urging of a state
party." If a state party urges the chairman to call a meeting of the
Council to consider a matter affecting the ARBM, the Council shall meet
within fifteen days of such request.1'7
Article III of the ARBM provides that states parties are to transmit
regularly to the Council information which will permit the Council to
monitor and access the overall situation of the world market for meat.'"
Such information shall include data on the past performance and current
situation with respect to meat, and an assessment of the outlook regard-
ing meat production, consumption, prices, stocks, and trade."' States
parties are also required to provide the Council with information concern-
ing domestic policies and trade measures in the bovine sector. 60 Based on
such information the Council shall evaluate the world supply and demand
situation and outlook."' If such evaluation indicates the existence of a
"serious imbalance" or threat thereof in the international meat market,
then the Council will proceed by "consensus"'' " to identify possible solu-
tions to remedy the situation.'" These possible solutions are merely for
the "consideration" of the states parties to the ARBM and need not be
adopted or implemented.'"
B. International Dairy Arrangement (IDA)
The IDA, which covers trade in milk and cream, butter, cheese and
curd, as well as casein,' 65 is designed to promote the expansion and liber-
alization of world trade in dairy products.'" In order to attain this objec-
152. Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, supra note 150, art. II.
153. Id. art. I.
154. Id.
155. Id. art. V(1).
156. Id. art. V(2).
157. Id. art. IV(6).
158. Id. art. I(1).
159. Id. art. 111(3).
160. Id.
161. Id. art. IV(1)(a).
162. Id. art. V(3) (indicating that "consensus" means unanimity).
163. Id. art. IV(2).
164. HOUSE COMM. REPORT, supra note 134, at 150.
165. International Dairy Arrangement, supra note 151, art. II.
166. Id. art I.
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tive, the IDA establishes an International Dairy Products Council com-
prised of representatives from all states parties, 67 vests the Council with
responsibilities and powers virtually identical to those assigned by the
ARBM to the International Meat Council,"6 8 and obligates states parties
to the IDA to adhere to the provisions of three protocols attached
thereto.'6 The Protocols Regarding Certain Milk Powders, Milk Fat, and
Certain Cheeses enunciate minimum price levels for sales to commercial
markets.
,Specifically, the Protocol Regarding Certain Milk Powders sets prices
of $425, $725, and $425 per metric ton for skimmed, whole, and butter-
milk powders respectively.170 The price levels per metric ton established
by the Protocol Regarding Milk Fat are $1100 for anhydrous milk fat and
$925 for butter.1 7 ' The price stated in the Protocol Regarding Certain
Cheeses is $800 per metric ton.17' The minimum price levels provided for
in the three protocols do not apply to sales made to non-commercial mar-
kets.1 7 3 Further, each of the protocols provides that the price levels stated
therein are subject to annual review and adjustment1 7" by one of the three
appropriate committees set up by the Council under the authority of arti-
cle VII(2) of the IDA to assure compliance with and implementation of
the provisions of each of the various protocols.
V. CONCLUSION
Though it is still far too early to assess the real impact of the results
of the Tokyo Round on United States international agricultural trade, it
seems safe to posit one obervation. Unlike previous rounds of trade nego-
tiations conducted under the auspices of the GATT, the round concluded
in Geneva in April of 1979 makes an attempt to deal comprehensively
with the issues which have plagued U.S. international agricultural trade
during the post-World War II era. Most of these issues have developed
out of the use of various NTB's and the absence of an effective informa-
tional and consultative network between trading partners. The four
multilateral codes of conduct and two international commodity agree-
ments discussed here should contribute substantially to the resolution of
these issues and the promotion of agricultural trade in general.
167. Id. art. VII.
168. Id. art. V.
169. Id. art. VI.
170. Id. Annex I, art. 3(2)(b).
171. Id. Annex II, art. 3(2)(b).
172. Id. Annex III, art. 3(2)(b).
173. HousE COMM. REPoRT, supra note 134, at 149.
174. International Dairy Arrangement, supra note 151, Annex I, art. 3(3)(b); id., Annex
I, art. 3(3)(b); id., Annex III, art. 3(3)(b).
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